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Abstract 
 
Millions of data capable mobile devices are currently in use around the world enabled by the 
growing acceptance of Internet over wireless networks. However, security mechanisms still 
remain nascent. Security plays a crucial role in facilitating the level of trust users place on 
mobile devices and applications. To effectively diffuse the mobile devices in the marketplace, 
sufficient levels of trust has to be established in the underlying security of mobile devices and 
applications. This paper is an appraisal of recent issues and emerging trends regarding 
mobile security, within the context of conducting mobile commerce via mobile networks by 
individual consumers and businesses. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Mobile communications is already enjoying a substantial market across the globe. According 
to a report from Accenture, the market for wireless Internet capable devices will grow by 630 
percent in 2005. Parallel to the increase in mobile phone penetration there is expected to be 
increased usage of PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants) which can also support some wireless 
services; which will further increase the number of transactions over the wireless networks 
(Hyman, 2002). By then, there is expected to be 1.7 billion mobile connections, and mobile 
eCommerce worth USD20 billion in the US alone (NUA 2001a). The Yankee Group believes 
that the European mCommerce market will be worth USD50 billion by 2006 (NUA 2001b).  
A new report from Analysys suggest that European prepaid mobile users could generate 
EUR16 million (USD15.6 million) in GPRS and UMTS non-voice service revenue by 2007 
(NUA 2002). The new world economy is about to witness the mobile phone transform into a 
  
unique personal identifier and assistant. It will only be a matter of time before there will be 
more wireless connections to the Internet than fixed and majority of eCommerce transactions 
will terminate or originate on a wireless device. 
 
If forecasts become true, the number of customers subscribed to mobile telephones will 
exceed one billion by 2003; and mCommerce will reach an annual value of $13 billion, or 
around 7 percent of all eCommerce transactions (McKinsey 2000). Japan's i-mode users 
spend US$21.60 a month (mCommerce world 2001). Boston Consulting Group estimates 
that mCommerce will generate worldwide revenues of $100 billion by 2003, half of which 
will come from transactions from as many as 300 million users (Eftia 2002). Durlacher 
estimates that the UK alone will generate £2.1bn from mCommerce in 2003, with 
advertising, shopping and financial services providing the most important revenue flows (Dti 
Telewest 2002). In a June survey, consulting firm Cap Gemini America Ernst & Young 
pointed out that 78% of wireless Internet subscribers will use cell phones for wireless-data 
applications by the end of 2002 (George 2002). 
 
Researchers are in the process of analysing what users really want in the form of mobile 
communication that may be anytime, from anywhere and any location (Ozen et al, 2001). 
Developers are working on the type of products or services that must be  recommended to the 
end user to provide customer satisfaction (Tveit 2001). The developers and service providers 
need to consider the current technical constraints such as lack of bandwidth, limited device 
capability and availability of software enablers (Muller-Veerse 1999, KPMG 2000) as well 
as to capitalise on the features of the traditional attributes of mobile technology; ubiquity, 
reachability, security and convenience, with the new third generation (3G) enhanced 
application features of localisation, personalisation and instant always-on connectivity 
(Durlacher 2001; Siau et al 2001).  
 
Security is a top concern when implementing new technologies such as wireless or storage-
area networks (Gasper 2001). As an extension of eCommerce into the untethered world, 
mCommerce brings with it some of the same concerns about security as customers move 
from PCs to PDAs (Emmerson 2001).  Muller-Veerse (1999) highlighted that security is a 
major concern and may impede the potential growth of mobile commerce. Engel-Flechsig 
(2001) support this by pointing out that the true commercial potential of mCommerce will 
not be realised until a standard security framework is established in the world markets. 
Failure to provide a secure system of mCommerce will significantly dampen consumer 
adoption rates (Ghosh and Swaminatha 2001).  However, Hampe et al (2001) disputed these 
arguments by suggesting that digital mobile phone networks are encrypted, which ensures 
that messages cannot be added, deleted or modified. Therefore, the sole ownership 
characteristics of the mobile phone supports non-repudiation of transactions by customers, 
thus safeguarding the vendors.  The personal manner of the mobile phones enables secure 
certificates to be stored inside the device and security of mobile commerce can be developed 
to address current concerns (Paavilainen, 2001). Neverthless,  as reported lately in a 
Newsfactor special report, security concerns are still impeding the progress of mobile 
commerce (Hirsch 2002). 
 
  
This paper is a preliminary attempt to investigate if security is still a major issue for mobile 
commerce growth, within the context of using mobile equipment via mobile networks by 
individual consumers and businesses. We have reported dominant concerns and some latest 
trends in addressing these concerns world-wide. 
 
2 Methodology 
 
Given the dynamic nature of the study, we have taken a positivist approach to this research 
where social realities are viewed as a complex of causal relations between events – 
themselves depicted as an emerging patchwork of relations between variables (Blaikie, 
1993). The findings reported in this paper are exploratory in nature, based on synthesized 
secondary data analysis recommended in preliminary information systems research 
(Jarvenpaa 1991; Neuman 1997) which involved synthesizing existing data collected for 
other purposes than for the research and making inferences. Due to the emerging and 
evolving nature of the subject, the research has been largely based on Internet based 
information, white papers, conference articles and recently published texts. 
 
3  Mobile Security – Its role, Importance and Risks  
 
Paavilainen (2001) defined mobile business as the exchange of goods, services and 
information using mobile technology.  As Kalakota and Robinson (2001) pointed out 
organizations need to focus on customer trust and satisfaction, if mCommerce has to succeed.  
Security plays an important role in enabling the development for the mobile data market 
(Durlacher 2001). It facilitates the level of trust that consumer and business users place on 
the mobile applications (Engel-Flechsig 2001). The full potential of consumer and business 
applications cannot be realised unless there is sufficient level of trust in the underlying 
security of mobile networks (Kalakota and Robinson 2001). The market will have to provide 
end-to-end security to address all security concerns (Ghosh & Swaminatha 2001). 
 
The primary goal of security in mobile commerce is to ensure privacy, data integrity and 
authentication between the user and the vendor or organisational system. Key features for 
highly secure mobile commerce  (Singh 2002; Paavilainen 2001; Sonera Smart Trust 2001, 
Torvinen 2000, Engel-Flechsig 2001) include: 
· Authentication : The user and merchant to verify that users are who they claim to be 
and have the authority to access the resource. Essentially this provides assurance that 
the parties you are doing business with are who they claim to be.  
· Non-repudiation: Users are unable to deny that they have sent a message or 
participated in a transaction. There is an assurance that the agreements are legally 
binding 
· Strong encryption: Encryption is through a hard to break through  cryptographic code 
· Integrity of data: This is the assurance that the information send or received is not 
tampered with on its journey. 
· Confidentiality: To keep the information encrypted and secure, so that no-one can tap 
into the communication. 
  
 
According to Jormalainen and Laine (2000) the acceptable and sufficient level of security is a 
compromise between the usability and strength of the used encryption method. The Digital 
Signature Law passed in the late nineties/early 2000 saw the introduction of a statutory 
requirement for asymmetric encryption, where both parties involved has a pair of keys, i.e. a 
public and a private key.  Member countries of European Union, Americas, most Asian and 
Asia-Pacific countries already have legislation on electronic signatures in place. This offers a 
solid foundation upon which the business world can build a solid eCommerce structure 
(Sievers 2000b). MCommerce received a big boost with this legislation as it gives digital 
signature the same legally binding effects as paper signatures (Mayor 2001, Sievers 2000b) 
 
As mobile devices are location-independent, personal, portable and widely distributed, they 
are well suited to become one of the dominant enablers for carrying out financial transactions 
and other activities related to electronic commerce (Torvinen 2000, Muller-Veerse 1999). 
Due to their mobile nature, notebook PC and wireless communication devices are more 
susceptible to security risks (Intel 2001). Banks in Europe are investing heavily in mobile 
banking; all major banks in Scandinavia are offering wireless services, accounting for 48 
percent of total Western Europe’s WAP-enabled mobile banking accounts, with 22 percent in 
the UK and 13 percent in Germany. The number of mobile banking accounts in Europe will 
grow from 1.8 million in 2001 to 31.8 million in 2004 (Engel-Flechsig 2001).  However, the 
customers in USA are still skeptical of mobile banking due to the security risks perceived by 
the consumer (Keen and Mackintosh 2001). It is apparent that when a financial transaction is 
made, the buyer must have the confidence that the goods paid for will be received and the 
clearing party must be assured that payment is authorized (Paavilanian, 2001; Lannerstrom 
2000). Reliable network security is an essential prerequisite for the expansion of the rapidly 
growing world of mobile commerce (Ghosh & Swaminatha 2001, Durlacher 2001, Engel-
Flechsig 2001).  MCommerce will only reach its full worldwide potential when 
confidentiality, authentication and non-repudiation can be guaranteed for online transactions 
(Kalakota and Robinson 2001; Lannerstrom 2000).  
 
Mayne (2001) quoted many industry reports which suggested that the negative publicity on 
lack of mCommerce security and incidents of fraud is impeding its growth to a certain extent.   
So far, the high penetration rates of mobile usage is in the areas of non-financial transactions 
vis-à-vis, entertainment, ringing tones and information (Keen and Mackintosh 2001).  
Applications like wireless banking are only limited to ‘information provision’ or read only as 
the mobile security still lacks the ability to conduct a legally binding transaction (Mayne 
2001). A survey highlighted that more than 70 percent of wireless users in the United States 
and Canada have concerns and privacy of their wireless communications (Mayor 2001b).  
 
Mobile communication is more vulnerable to security attacks such as interception and 
unauthorized access than fixed network communication (Lee et al 2001; Lubinski 1998; 
Ghosh & Swaminatha 2001). To secure a channel, it is required to maintain the 
confidentiality of the message and provide mutual authentication between a base station and 
a mobile station (Lee et al 2001). Security breaches associated with wireless networks 
include interception of data such as credit card authorization and law enforcement data, email 
  
messages, stealing of cellular airtime and physical breach of security at unmanned base 
stations or other communication centers (Chen 2001). 
 
Mobile networks need greater security, as they are not completely safe at present. No mobile 
network operator can guarantee that confidential information (e.g. credit card details, 
personal information trade secrets, or business documents) can be transmitted over the 
mobile net securely. Therefore trust has to be built into the wireless environments (Torvinen 
2000). Ghosh and Swaminatha (2001) highlighted that mobile commerce not only faces 
similar risks to fixed line Internet commerce but also new security and privacy risks 
particular to the wireless medium abound in mobile commerce applications which was 
supported by Mayne (2001) and Keen and Mackintosh (2001). They highlighted the new 
security risks such as the nature of the medium required trust and cooperation between 
member nodes in network, which can be exploited by malicious entities to deny service as 
well as collect confidential information, and disseminates false information. Additionally, the 
devices and Wireless Markup Language (WML) language developed for wireless devices 
have failed to adopt fundamental security concepts employed in current generation of 
desktop machines(Paavilainen 2001; Kalakota and Robinson 2001). 
 
Manufacturers of many wireless devices have failed to include basic operating systems 
security features to protect access to the memory. This is a risk as rogue applications can 
“steal” decrypted data (e.g. private key) by interrupting it at the right moment. This is 
becoming a weak link in the converged data world as open standards brings with it unlimited 
possibilities for the propagation of malicious code (Ghosh & Swaminatha 2001, Durlacher 
2001). NTT DoCoMo’s introduction of JAVA service for mobile phones resulted in an 
emergence of Trojans viruses that could cause the handsets to place calls to a large number of 
people or dial an emergency number (Durlacher 2001, Mobilecommerceworld 2001). 
 
Additionally, the lack of access control for WML script means that rogue WML script can be 
pushed to a device without the owner’s knowledge (Schuba & Wrona 2001). The potential 
damage can range from exposure of personal identifying information that is kept on the 
device to the exposure of credit card details, banking account details, user name and 
passwords associated with these accounts via the use of bogus web sites. Malicious scripts 
will then have the ability to falsely ring up charges or potentially divest money from 
smartcards or bank accounts (Paavilainen 2001). Therefore, the most significant risk to 
mobile commerce systems will be from malicious code that is beginning to penetrate the 
wireless network. It has the ability to undermine other security technologies such as signing, 
authentication and encryption (Ghosh & Swaminatha 2001; Schuba & Wrona 2001). 
 
Wireless devices pass through many different, potentially non-trustworthy networks from 
which service is derived and data is exchanged. Information can be stolen or altered without 
the end users knowledge. Most vendor implementations of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or 
Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) do not reauthenticate principals or recheck 
certificates once a disrupted service is re-connected. Attackers can use this vulnerability to 
their advantage in wireless networks (Ghosh and Swaminatha 2001, Lubinski 1998). 
Dramatic drops in hardware prices in 2000-2001 have made it attractive and convenient for 
corporations and home user to go wireless, in particular with equipment built on the 802.11 
  
standard. (Kalakota and Robinson 2001). But computer security experts say that in the rush 
towards liberation from the tethers of computer cable, individuals and companies are opening 
the doors to a whole new type of computer intrusion. Hardware to listen to 802.11 
transmissions is readily available to attackers in the form of consumer 802.11 products 
(Poulsen 2001).  
4 Security Technologies 
 
Keen and Mackintosh (2001) argue that mCommerce is still not secure due to the basic 
characteristics of wireless as a communication medium and the immaturity of technology 
relevant to mCommerce.  Paavilainen (2001) argues that partnerships are needed in this area 
in order to provide organizations with a deeper understanding of security risks in 
mCommerce transactions.  Several security techniques have been considered and 
implemented for mobile commerce over the last few years by industry players who realised 
that security is an important aspect of consumer confidence and hence its adoption. Despite 
that, ongoing concerns with security have been continually highlighted by the media or raised 
by industry researchers and experts.  
 
Wireless viruses and subscription fraud are some of the wireless security threats that could 
become barriers to mobile commerce as consumers grow wary of using mobile devices to 
conduct transactions (George 2001). The ensuing security technologies that have been 
attempted until recently, their characteristics, strengths and weaknesses are summarized in 
the subsections. 
 
4.1 SSL and SET 
 
The SSL or Secure Socket Layer handshake Protocol was developed by Netscape 
Communications Corporation  to provide security and privacy over the Internet (Jormalainen 
and Laine 2000) The protocol supports a secure connection between server and client.  The 
SSL protocol maintains the security and integrity of the transmission channel by using 
encryption, authentication and message authentication codes. It is the most common protocol 
used in mCommerce, but does not provide security for individual messages (Turban et al 
2001).  
 
Mobile security technology emerged in the form of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) within a 
closed end-to-end system with the GSM phones. The smartcard within the terminal, the SIM 
(Subscriber Identification Module) card, provides authentication of the owner and enables a 
higher level of security than typically achieved in the fixed Internet environment. Paavilainen 
(2001) pointed out that Nordea, Nokia and Visa are developing electronic mobile payment 
services that enable secure mobile payments through dual-slot mobile phone with chip cards.  
The first slot is the SIM card that identifies the consumer, while the second slot is for 
banking transactions including a small credit card, which enables variety of transactions from 
vending machines to supermarket purchases (Paavilainen, 2001) In 2001, a comprehensive 
standard for credit card processing in secure electronic transaction (SET) protocol  
incorporating digital signatures, certification , encryption and an agreed-upon gateway to 
  
banks was under way (Turban et al 2001). However, none of these nascent developments are 
sufficient for ensuring highly secure wireless commerce (Arbaugh 2001), as the concept of 
online banking cannot be brought directly into the mobile environment (Kalakota and 
Robinson, 2001) without mature standard technologies. 
4.2 Wireless Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)  
 
The Radicchio Initiative, launched in 1999, is an industry coalition to push wireless public 
key infrastructure (PKI) based mobile commerce security standards to the industry players. 
PKI is a set of processes and technologies that uses public key cryptography and key 
certification practices to secure Internet services (Torvinen 2000, Sonera Smart Trust 2001). 
PKI uses encryption keys, as well as certification and authentication mechanism to ensure 
data integrity between parties. The PKI system is a comprehensive security system that is 
bases on three elements: two encryption keys, a digital signature, and a security certificate 
(2002). PKI works on a private and public key system whereby only a specific pair of keys 
works together to code and decode data. PKI meets the needs for securing wireless 
eCommerce by guaranteeing identity, authenticity, confidentiality and non-repudiation 
(Engel-Flechsig 2001, Brooks & Warren 2001, Lannerstrom 2000, Muller-Veerse 1999, 
Durlacher 2001). However there is a weakness in PKI as there must be a third party 
organisation, called the certificate authority, that keeps and catalogs the public keys of the 
sender and the receiver. Solutions have started to surface but none commercially deployed to-
date (Brook & Warren 2001). Secure transactions with strong PKI encryption can be done 
using a special SIM card inserted into a mobile phone (Paavilainen 2001).  
 
Many developers do not yet know the advantages of PKI and it is not widely used (Sievers 
2000). Sonera Smart Trust (2001) and Lee et al (2001) highlighted that PKI has become the 
standard for establishing this trust and executing binding contracts over electronic networks 
as only public key cryptosystems can provide non-repudiation and confidentiality. However, 
in spite of the advantages of a public key cryptosystems, it is not fully utilised because of the 
poor computing power and small battery capacity of a mobile phone.  There is general 
agreement that PKI will provide the much-needed fully secured mobile environment (Muller-
Veerse 1999, Durlacher 2001, Engel-Flechsig 2001, Brooks and Warren 2001, Sievers 2000, 
Torvinen 2000). The recent legislation will have a positive impact on the development of the 
wireless PKI and the establishment of trust towards the applications that will exploit the 
opportunities created by mobile commerce (Sievers 2000, Mayne 2001). Muller-Veerse 
(1999) suggested that the success of PKI as the standard secure wireless commerce would 
depend heavily on how Radicchio can market themselves to the market and the support from 
the industry players.  
 
Establishing trust in wireless Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is crucial for the success of 
applications that will exploit the opportunities created by handheld mobile devices. This trust 
is based on the reliability of the technology and also the carefully implemented system of 
laws, policies, standards and procedures. The trust structures that are needed in order to take 
advantage of the security offered by the PKI are in place and supported in an ever-growing 
number of countries. The freedom of the mobile world combined with the security and 
  
authentication made possible by PKI will change the face of commerce for business and 
consumers. 
 
 
 
4.3 WAP and WTLS 
 
The Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) was developed by the WAP Forum industry 
association to provide specifications for the applications that operate over wireless 
communication networks to meet the challenges in building advanced differentiated services 
and implementations in a fast and flexible way (Jormalainen and Laine, 2000). WTLS is a 
layer that operates above the transport protocol layer and it provides the upper level layer of 
the WAP with a security transport service interface.  
 
The WTLS is the first attempt to provide a secure end-to-end connection for the WAP or in 
other words, to provide privacy and reliability for client-server communications over a 
network. While SSL primarily provides security over the Internet, WTLS is specific to 
wireless applications using WAP (Mikal 2001). The WAP Forum has defined a set of 
security protocols to facilitate the mobile operators and industry players to meet the 
challenges in advanced services creation. The security layer protocol in the WAP architecture 
is WTLS. Depending on the required security level of the application, it can be turned on or 
off. WTLS provides privacy, data integrity and authentication between two communication 
applications.  
 
In Australia, analysts have attributed the slow take-up of WAP-based information to 
concerns over the security in the mobile commerce space. In a bid to address this concerns, 
vendors have launched the WAP Form’s WTLS specification, which is designed to overcome 
security problems in current WAP implementations (Braue 2000). According to Brooks & 
Warren (2001), end-to-end security in WAP is achieved by two protocols; WTLS and 
HTTPS (Hypertext Transport Protocol Security) and offers a greater level of security than 
offered on the traditional web and credit card transaction carried out by voice or even in 
person. To achieve maximum level security, the WAP gateway must reside on the local 
network as the content server. However none of the commercially available WAP Gateways 
actually implements the security protocol and there is no security in today’s WAP 
applications with existing products (Brooks & Warren 2001, Scuba & Wrona 2001; Chan 
2000).  
 
There is a debate regarding the “WAP Gap” where there is a lack of security at the point 
when wireless request to web pages are translated at the WAP gateway from the WTLS to 
the stand ard SSL protocol used in securing HTTP requests. Perpetrators are able to 
compromise the message at this point of transfer when data is not protected by either the 
WTLS or SSL security technology (Ghosh and Swaminatha 2001; Chan 2000; The 
WirelessFAQ 2001). However, Ghosh and Swaminatha (2001) dismissed that as a “red 
herring” and claimed that this “Wap Gap” is likely to be solved in the near future by a simple 
modification in the existing protocol. They also believe that data encryption over 
  
communication channels have been the strongest perceived security element in the system. 
Saarinen (2001) identified that a number of security flaws in the WAP WTLS: a chosen 
plaintext data recovery attack; datagram truncation attack; message forgery attack and key-
search shortcut for exportable keys and suggested that the WTLS needs revision. 
 
4.4 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
 
Wired Equivalent Privacy is a security protocol for wireless local area networks or WLANs 
defined in the 802.11b standard, designed to provide the same level of security as that of a 
wired local area network. However, WLANs, which are over radio waves, do not have the 
same physical structure and therefore are more vulnerable to tampering (Webopedia, 2002). 
WEP is part of the system security of 802.11 and its goals are to provide confidentiality and 
data integrity, and to protect access to the network infrastructure by rejecting all non-WEP 
packets (Loeb 2001).WEP aims to provide security by encrypting data over radio waves so 
that it is protected as it is transmitted from one end point to another. However, as WEP uses 
the two lowest layers of the open system interconnection model - the data link and physical 
layers - it does not offer end-to-end security (Webopedia 2002) 
WEP uses a secret key shared between the communicators. Some versions use the 40-bit key 
that was originally used to formulate the standard, while other newer versions use a 128-bit 
key (Loeb 2001). WEP protocol is used in 802.11 networks to protect link-level data during 
wireless transmission. Radio waves from wireless local area networks (WLAN) can extend to 
areas outside the organisations physical premises and easily penetrates buildings and are 
receivable from a distance (Issac 2001). This increases its exposure to everyone wishing to 
peruse the network without physically plugging in a cable.  Someone can passively retrieve 
sensitive information from a distance without being noticed by network security personnel ( 
Durlacher 2001; Weatherspoon 2000; IBM Research 2001).   
Weatherspoon (2000) suggested that the 802.11 security standard provides a mechanism for 
authentication and encryption for the WLAN with the WEP protocol. The 802.11 standard is 
specified with a 40-bit encryption to meet US regulatory export requirements of a maximum 
56-bit encryption. Intel and other companies are working together to propose enhanced 
security for the 802.11 standard. However, IBM Research (2001) revealed that WEP and 
Shared Key are optional, and turned off by default in access points.  If these protocols  are not 
turned on in even one access point, it is easy for hackers to connect to the network, using 
standard wireless cards and drivers (Isaac 2001).   
 Many authors (Arbaugh 2001, Borisov et al 2001, Stubblefield et al 2001, Goldberg 2001, 
Fluhrer 2001, Durlacher 2001, Schuba and Wrona, 2001) note that in the year 2001, several 
scientists demonstrated the ease in which attacks can be made on WLAN within the Wireless 
Encryptions Privacy  (WEP) that is used for securing the wireless network. They managed to 
read WEP-protected traffic, add bogus traffic into a WEP-protected network as well as 
change WEP-protected traffic in transit. This flaw in WEP prevents it from providing even a 
minimal reliable level of security for serious applications. WEP's biggest weakness may be 
that it's based on a static key. This means that if anyone's laptop is stolen or lost, the key for 
  
the entire corporation is automatically compromised. Some of WEP's weakness stems from 
implementation, where mistakes were made in the underlying algorithm. Others have to do 
with the way in which authentication is performed using Ethernet addresses, which can be 
forged. A further problem: the encryption key or keys for all users on the same network must 
share WEP, reducing the keys’ secure value. The best strategy is to add another security 
mechanism on top of it (Arbaugh et al 2001; Issac 2001; Paavilainen 2001) 
The problem of WEP is that while it discourages the casual listener, it cannot withstand any 
serious attack. This is likely due to the design choices that were made to avoid the 
computational overhead of a Mac, using the simpler CRC instead. Whatever the flaw's 
origins, it seems that WEP by itself can't assure security (Loeb 2001). Other 802.11 products 
provide encryption beyond WEP, but this protection generally comes at the cost of 
interoperability. Users can also deploy encryption wares that use virtual private networks, 
Secure Sockets Layer or Pretty Good Privacy, but this can mean large investments of time 
and money (Garcia 2001). Arbaugh (2001) highlighted that there are new products, new 
protocols, and current solutions, which provide access points and related equipment to 
overcome this WEP weakness in 802.11 networks. Welch (2001) however dismissed the 
hacking of the WEP as a misunderstanding of the true intentions of WEP. Welch (2001) and 
Garcia (2001) argued that WEP was never meant to be an industrial data security algorithm. 
It was never designed to protect data from more intelligent crackers but designed to make up 
for the inherent insecurity in wireless transmission, as compared to wired transmission. By 
using the WEP, at least the data is as secure as it would be on an unencrypted, wired Ethernet 
network. Nonetheless, Welch (2001) agreed that additional network security should be 
deployed in conjunction with WEP.  
The irony of security in wireless was that when the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers) designed the 802.11 standard for mobile networks, security was 
actually one of IEEE’s primary considerations. The IEEE’s goal was to provide a level of 
protection equivalent to wired networks and their approach became known as WEP (Wired 
Equivalent Privacy Protocol). WEP was supposed to provide for access authentication and 
encryption of mobile network traffic. Although the WEP design may have been well thought 
out, it is unfortunate that the implementation has proven to be fundamentally flawed as it 
failed to take into consideration the physical limitation in enforcing such protocol. The 
practical aspect was ignored with huge service level gaps widening as mobile usage caught 
on in an unprecedented manner (Mah Chor Kiat 2002). 
Boscia & Shaw (2001) from NASA proposed a multi-functional device called Wireless 
Firewall Gateway (WFG) to facilitate the management of the wireless network, which also 
maintain a secure network mode and keep a high level of usability. WFG acts as a router 
between a wireless and external network with the ability to dynamically change firewall 
filters as users authenticate themselves for authorized access. It is also a server responsible 
for handing out IP addresses to users, running a website in which users can authenticate, and 
maintaining a recorded account of who is on the network and when. Minimal configuration is 
required by the user, allowing support for a variety of computer platforms with no additional 
software. The main objective is to keep the wireless network as user-friendly as possible 
while maintaining security (Turban et al, 2002).  However, the effectiveness of the WFG is 
  
an unknown due to its infancy and remains to be proven. At this point in time, the only 
applications that should be developed for a wireless environment are those that are not 
mission-critical or that are protected with firewalls, token devices for authentication, 
encryption, and Intrusion Detection Systems. There is no security mechanism inherent in the 
802.11 standard that can substitute for these (Fennelly 2001). 
5 Emerging Security Solutions  
 
Security solutions are an integral part of mCommerce transactions (Paavilainen 2001). 
Wireless consumers are experiencing the same attacks that Internet users have been plagued 
with and the industry has few solutions (Ghosh & Swaminatha 2001; Mobilecommerceworld 
2001). The risks presented by malicious mobile scripts are massive. The security 
technologies will not be able to circumvent the risks posed by the malicious codes, therefore 
devices and platforms manufacturers must build a more robust and secure system. The 
current version of WAP 1.2 uses WML and WML script, and is therefore also exposed to this 
threat. However, WAP version 2.0 has replaced WML for a more robust language like 
XHTML or JavaScript, which will help to reduce the exposure of a mobile user. Through a 
set of standard releases, primarily version 1.2.1 in June 2000 and version 2.0 in July 2001, 
major security issues of WAP have been addressed (Juul and Jorgensen, 2002). According to 
them, the best strategy for addressing the security and privacy risks of Internet-based content 
is to build security into the platform and applications themselves (see also Ghosh and 
Swaminatha 2001).  
  
To address the shortcoming of WTLS WAP, a WAP Forum draft called "The WAP 
Transport Layer E2E Security Specification" presents a scheme to eliminate the need for 
decryption/re-encryption at the WAP gateway. A WAP client's request is redirected using an 
XML document. This document supplies the WAP client with instructions on how to make a 
direct, secure connection with a secondary proxy, which provides direct access to the content 
server. This method inherently bypasses the WAP client's default gateway (Mikal 2001).  
Widespread implementation and deployment of WAP client security certificates will bring 
additional improvements. Security certificates digitally identify a WAP client and let it send 
and receive encrypted information. Currently, the content provider's application must handle 
digital signing of WAP client requests, or the WML Script Crypto library can create the 
digital signature. 
Three major industry players have joined forces to develop an open and common industry 
framework for secure mobile electronic transactions. They plan to use the existing WAP 
security functions such as WTLS and Wireless Identification Module, wireless Public Key 
Technologies and already implemented mobile payment schemes as the technology 
cornerstone for the new initiative. Chrysalis-ITS and SmartTrust formed a  partnership to 
provide the European PKI market with a set of software-managed, hardware-secured 
solutions for digital certificate applicatio ns like PKI, OCSP and smart card issuance 
(SmartTrust 2001). However, they may come up against consumers who are reluctant to 
make online purchase having read the negative publicity on wireless hacking (Enos 2000).  
Solutions have been proposed to overcome the WEP security exposure and work in currently 
  
in progress by all interested parties from the industry standards group to the vendors and 
other experts in the security fed. 
All the negative publicity on WEP has finally brought forth positive outcomes. Vendors are 
responding to the flawed protocols with fixes in several stages. In the short term, vendors are 
adding new authentication/key management protocols that provide secure authentication, and 
that provide new WEP keys for each card, for each session. In addition, in the near term, 
vendors are working on a tweak to WEP to make attacks more difficult, and they are also 
working on a long-term complete fix (IBM Research 2002). IEEE 802.11 Task Group i has 
conceded that security provisions need to improve (Santalesa 2001).  IEEE Task Group i 
submitted four proposals in September 2001 for fixing the WEP problem that would provide 
a secure solution to all of the vulnerabilities so far identified. RSA Security Inc announced a 
solution for the flaws in WEP in December 2001, which uses RC4 algorithm to repair the 
WEP encryption standard.  This new technology, accepted by the IEEE 802.11 committee, 
uses fast packet keying by generating a unique RC4 key for each and every data packet sent 
over the Wireless Lan (Peretz, 2001).  
However, Fluhrer et al (2002) identified a further problem with RC4 that a fraction of keys in 
it are weak, revealing more of the structure of early bytes in the output than there ought to be. 
By exploiting the statistical properties of this weakness, an attacker can crack any message in 
hours, independently of other attacks. Arar (2002) refered to a fix for security flaws in the 
802.11a and 802.11b wireless network standards with a new 802.11i draft for a security 
algorithm called Temporal Key Integrity Protocol. TKIP, like WEP, is based on RC4 
encryption--but implemented in a different way that addresses those vulnerabilities. Among 
other things it generates new encryption keys for every 10 kilobytes of data transmitted 
(Arar, 2002). 
The process of developing secure wireless networks is similar to the process of securing 
Internet transactions, but according to an executive research report by the Yankee Group 
(George 2002) wireless security solutions must consider bandwidth and memory limitations, 
battery life, and different network configurations, which aren't inherent to the Internet. Most 
wireless applications are embedded with Wireless Application Protocol or public -key 
infrastructure technology, which authenticates users. Other means of securing wireless data 
use passwords or encryption to protect the transfer of information through airwaves. Security 
of mCommerce can thus be developed to address the current concerns, where consumers are 
reluctant to purchase online. Keen and Mackintosh (2001) argue that many committees, 
consortia and companies are working flat out to plug security holes in mCommerce through 
new techniques for encryption, authentication, digital certificates, smart cards and secure 
payment methods. However, the wireless infrastructures that enable mCommerce are either 
not reliable or not yet in place. According to Lisa Pretty, executive director of the PKI forum, 
U.S. makers of wireless applications are slow to adopt some high-end security features that 
are being widely used in Europe and Japan (George 2002).  
6 Conclusions 
 
  
Mobile commerce security continues to be a major issue. Although, industry players and 
trade consortiums are endeavoring to formulate an environment that allows mobile operators, 
financial institutions and other service providers to facilitate secure mobile transactions, a 
secure end-to-end security have not been provided to address all security concerns as yet. 
Consumer trust is a major factor that must not be underestimated.  The trust structures that 
are needed for a secure mobile eCommerce are in place, with the various security 
technologies and frameworks that are continuously been improved upon.  
 
The introduction of the new legal framework to guarantee the recognition of digital 
signatures ensures the security of data that is transmitted electronically. This new legislation 
on electronic / digital signatures and certification services are significant to the development 
of PKI-solutions mobile security. In months and years to come, lawmakers, regulatory bodies 
and industry will continue their efforts towards developing a stable legal and regulatory 
environment that makes it possible for end-to-end secure wireless communications to be 
achieved with the security characteristics of authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality 
and data integrity. Perhaps, the day is not far when this trust factor be fulfilled and the 
consumer experience can be translated into mCommerce applications such as personal 
banking, stock trading, gambling, ticket reservations and mobile etailing, on a global level. 
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